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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for one count of
Stalking, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) whereby the Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over appeals from the district court for a
conviction in a criminal case other than for a first degree or
capital felony.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Provided in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Point I.

Whether Utah's Stalking statute is overbroad on

its face as well as it is applied to Mr. Lopez' case and
therefore unconstitutional under the United States and Utah
Constitutions.
Standard of Review.

A trial court's conclusion that a

statute is constitutional presents a question of law reviewed for
correctness.
Point II.

State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991) .
Whether Utah's Stalking statute is

unconstitutionally vague on its face.

Standard of Review.

A trial court's conclusion that a

statute is constitutional presents a question of law reviewed for
correctness.

State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On September 18, 1995, Roberto Lopez (hereinafter "Mr.
Lopez") was charged by second amended criminal information with
Stalking, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-106.5.

R. 30. Mr. Lopez filed a motion to dismiss and

supporting memoranda based on the grounds that the Stalking
statute was unconstitutional for overbreadth and vagueness on its
face and as applied under both the United States and Utah
Constitutions.

R. 31-116, 206-255. A hearing was held before

the trial court on October 17, 1995 and the trial court took the
motion under advisement.
66.

Transcript of Motion Hearing, R. 644-

The trial court denied the motion as it applied to Mr.

Lopez' facial attack on the statute and reserved the right to
rule on the motion as it applied to the specific facts which
would be brought out at trial.

R. 256-57.

During trial, after

the State's case was presented, the trial court also denied Mr.
Lopez' motion as it applied to the facts of the case.

Transcript

of trial, R. 529.
Following the trial, Mr. Lopez was found guilty of Stalking
by the jury and was sentenced.

R. 358-59, 623, 637. The court

imposed six months jail, all of which was suspended and eighteen
months of court probation.

The court also fined Mr. Lopez $1850

and ordered an evaluation for counseling.
filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

R. 360. Mr. Lopez

R. 362-63.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The City's evidence at trial established five different
instances of contact between Mr. Lopez and Maria Mota from which
the jury had to chose from in deciding whether there was a course
of conduct.
1.

New Years Eve Party, December 31, 1993:

Mr. Lopez went

to a Hispanic community New Years Eve party also attended by
Maria Mota.

He walked up to Ms. Mota, made a hand gesture

described as his right fist striking his left open hand and
stating that he loved Ms. Mota.
Lopez then left.
2.

Trial Transcript, R. 386.

Mr.

R. 387, 404, 477-78.

May, 1994 vehicle incident;

Ms. Mota testified that as

she was traveling in a vehicle, Mr. Lopez, driving another
vehicle, followed her and "[h]e like sped up, he like drove
really fast by the side of my car . . . he just tried to get in
front of me, trying to see if I would hit his car."
Lopez then drove off.
3.

R. 389.

Mr.

R. 391.

May, 1994, High School:

Mr. Lopez walked up to Ms.

Mota and her friend at Ms. Mota's High School and stated that he
wanted to talk to Ms. Mota.

Ms. Mota told Mr. Lopez that she did

not want to talk to him and she entered the school.

Mr. Lopez

did not follow Ms. Mota and she did not see him again that day.
R. 392, 431.
4.

June, 1994, Graduation:

Mr. Lopez attended the High

School graduation ceremony at which Ms. Mota was graduating.
Mota saw Mr. Lopez looking at her.

3

R. 393, 438, 445-46.

Ms.

5.

June 22, 1994, Sears: Mr. Lopez approached Ms. Mota at

her place of employment at Sears on Eighth South and State
Street.

Mr. Lopez stated "you better talk to me."

up the escalator and Mr. Lopez left.

Ms. Mota ran

R. 394-95.

Ms. Mota testified to the following regarding the effect
that the continued contact with Mr. Lopez had on her.

Ms. Mota

testified that she repeatedly told Mr. Lopez that she did not
want any contact with him.

R. 395. Ms. Mota also testified

regarding the affect of the continuing contact with Mr. Lopez: "I
just have had nightmares of the things that he's said and done to
me and things that he's .. could do to me.

I feel that I was

never a teenager, I was unable to join any of the school
activities."

R. 398. Ms. Mota also testified generally about

being afraid of Mr. Lopez.

R. 3 99, 423. Ms. Mota also saw a

school counselor regarding her fear of Mr. Lopez.

R. 415, 425.

Ms. Mota was nineteen turning twenty during this period of time
in 1994. R. 416.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Stalking statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 is
unconstitutionally overbroad on its face and as applied to Mr.
Lopez' case.

Both the United States Constitution and the Utah

Constitution recognize a constitutional right to the freedom of
association and the freedom of movement.

Kolender v. Lawson. 461

U.S. 352, 358 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 163-64 (1972); Utah Constitution, Article I, sections 1
and 15.

The Utah Stalking Statute prohibits a substantial amount
4

of protected conduct and is not narrowly tailored to meet the
governmental interest of prohibiting "stalking" types of acts.
The statute is therefore facially overbroad.

Additionally, the

statute is overbroad as applied to the facts brought out during
Mr. Lopez' trial.
Furthermore, the statute does not define the phrase
"emotional distress," and is therefore unconstitutionally vague.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH STALKING STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE ON ITS
FACE UNDER BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONS
A.

Introduction
A person is guilty of Stalking in Utah if that person:

(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause
a reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a
member of his immediate family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to
himself or a member of his immediate family;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the
specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of
bodily injury to himself or a member of his
immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a
member of his immediate family will suffer
emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct:
(i) induces fear in the specific person of
bodily injury to himself or a member of his
immediate family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in the
specific person or a member of his immediate
family.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2).

"Course of conduct" is defined

as: "repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a
person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or

5

threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at
or toward a person."

§ 76-5-106.5(1)(a).

defined as "two or more occasions."

"Repeatedly" is

§ 76-5-106.5(1) (c) .

As noted by Robert P. Faulkner and Douglas H. Hsiao in their
article appearing in the Harvard Journal on Legislation, the
difficulty in adopting stalking statutes is: "how can legislators
draft a statute that criminalizes 'stalking,' a concept not
susceptible to precise definition, without trampling on
constitutional values?"

Faulkner and Hsiao, And Where You Go

I'll Follow; The Constitutionality of Antistalking Laws and
Proposed Model Legislation, 31 Harv. J. Leg. 1, 3 (1994)
(hereinafter, referred to as "Faulkner").x

As the discussion

below points out, Utah's statute fails this test by "sweeping and
indefinite legislation that criminalizes conduct protected by the
[state and federal] constitutions," and it "vests too much
discretion in police officers to enforce vague criteria."
Faulkner at 2.2
B.

Utah's Stalking Statute is Unconstitutional as it is
Facially Overbroad

A defendant may challenge the facial validity of a criminal
1

Faulkner concluded that "existing antistalking legislation
[in
forty-three
states
including
Utah]
is
facially
unconstitutional, with the possible exception of the laws in
Alaska, Connecticut, Maryland, New Mexico, and North Carolina. Id.
at 4, 15. Other than those four exceptions, the statutes and
ordinances in these states "sweep too broadly, suffer from acute
cases of vagueness, and/or employ content-based distinctions based
on the perceived 'message' of the stalker." Id. at p. 15.
2

This Court has addressed the constitutionality of Utah's
Stalking statute in an unpublished Memorandum Decision. State v.
Lifang, Case No.940717-CA (Utah App. filed December 7, 1995).
6

statute for overbreadth even assuming as well as challenging the
application of the statute to the facts of the defendant's case.
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).

The Broadrick

Court required that where conduct and not merely speech was
involved, then the "overbreadth of the statute must not only be
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep."

Id. at 615.

Therefore, a

court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches
a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct."
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
494 (1982); Logan Citv v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah App.
1990).

"If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail

and [the court] should then examine the vagueness challenge." Id.
A statute "may be held facially invalid even if it also has
legitimate application."

Id.

Analyzing Utah's Stalking statute, the constitutional
infirmity is found in the way the statute allows minimal and
protected conduct of physical or visual proximity to be
proscribed.

The use of the conjunctive "or" in the definition of

"course of conduct" allows that on two or more occasions, the
defendant simply "maintain[ed] a visual or physical proximity"
without any conveyance of threat whatsoever. The use of "or" in
subsection 2(a), (b) and (c) provides that such visual or
physical proximities become stalking if the actor intended to or
should have known that the conduct would cause a reasonable
person emotional distress, and that the conduct actually created
7

emotional distress.
The protected conduct infringed upon by Utah's stalking
statute is the right to associate and move about freely in
public.

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized a

constitutional right of freedom of movement under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.

Kolender v. Lavrson. 461 U.S. 352, 358

(1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 16364 (1972); Stotland v. Pennsylvania, 398 U.S. 916, 26 L.Ed.2d 83,
85 (1970) (Douglas, J. dissenting from per curiam dismissal)
(recognizing "one's constitutional right to freedom of movement
which of course is essential to the exercise of First Amendment
rights.").
In addition to the protection of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, this Court should
rule that Utah's Constitution, Article I, sections 1 and 15,
protect a person's constitutional rights of association and
freedom of movement.

While Article I, section 15 contains

similar language to the First Amendment right to freedom of
speech and press, section 1 has additional language not contained
in the First Amendment.
The First Amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.
The Utah Constitution, Article I, section 15 states:
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the
8

freedom of speech or of the press.
(Emphasis added).

Article I, section 1 states:

All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire,
possess and protect property; to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble
peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for
redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse
of that right.
(Emphasis added).

Both portions of the Utah Constitution

highlighted suggest a broader protection than provided by the
federal counterpart.

This Court should therefore find that the

Utah Constitution provides a substantial constitutional right to
the freedom of association and movement.
By prohibiting a person's freedom of association and
movement limited only by the intent or knowledge that it would
cause a reasonable person emotional distress, Utah's legislature
has infringed upon that right in not only a real, but a
substantial way.

Indeed, with no definition of "emotional

distress", it is difficult to imagine how the Legislature could
have conceived of and adopted a more restrictive statute.
The different examples of constitutionally protected conduct
proscribed by the language of Utah's statute are endless.

For

example, a defendant is in the middle of a heated divorce and
custody battle with defendant's spouse.

The defendant knows that

because of the history and breakdown of the marriage that the
spouse becomes so distressed at the sight of defendant that the
spouse has a physical response to the emotion and becomes ill.
However, the defendant has visitation rights and inevitably and
9

knowingly is in the presence of the spouse whenever picking up
the children. Under Utah's statute, the defendant's repeated
actions of picking the children may come under the prohibition of
the statute.
Any number of different scenarios could come from two people
that were involved in a relationship that ended so terribly that
to ever see each other would certainly cause both significant
distress.

Both have mutual friends and acquaintances that

require both to attend social functions where the other will
certainly be.

The action of going to the social event knowing

the other will be there and suffer "emotional distress" would
arguably be Stalking if it happened twice.
Another example of protected conduct is where an accused
must appear in court and face the victim of some violent crime.
A person is accused of a crime, for example a violent robbery.
The accused, standing innocent in the eyes of the court before
trial, appears for court appearances regularly, knowing that the
victim, who was violently assaulted, believes the accused
committed the crime.

Every time the accused appears at court,

the victim is waiting outside the courthouse.

The accused

approaches the courthouse and the victim, seeing the accused,
becomes overwhelmed, ill and faints.

Regardless of whether the

accused was the actual assailant, the victim could very well
suffer emotional distress under any definition, and the accused
would have knowledge that the emotional distress would occur.

As

ridiculous as this example sounds, it would qualify as stalking
10

under the Utah Statute.
This last example identifies the foremost problem with the
Utah Statute.

That is, the accused person in a stalking case

need not have committed any act, such as a threat, prior to the
physical or visual proximity of another.

In other words, all

that is required is that the accused know that for some reason,
the complainant suffers some emotional distress, however slight,
at the visual or physical proximity of the accused.

It could be

based upon a mistaken identity of the accused as the person who,
in the recent past, did some terrible or not so terrible thing to
the complainant.

Even if the accused actually did nothing in the

past, if the accused knows of the complainant's mistaken belief,
then the accused also knows that the complainant will suffer
emotional distress whenever they are within visual or physical
proximity of each other.
A review of the stalking statutes of other states further
highlights the examples above.

The stalking statutes in Alabama,

California and Florida all have three major components.
the offense must be committed intentionally.

First,

Second, and more

important here, all three states require that there be a
"credible threat."

State v. Randall, 669 So.2d 223, 226 (Ala Cr.

App. 1995) (comparing the similarities of stalking statutes in
Alabama, California and Florida).

Third, "there must be an 'act'

of repeatedly following or harassing another person that places
that person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm."
Id.

The Utah statute has none of these limiting factors which
11

other states have addressed when defending challenges of
overbreadth and vagueness.

Under Alabama, California and Florida

law, none of the above examples of protected conduct would be
considered stalking.
C.

The Utah Stalking Statute Is Not Narrowly Tailored To
Serve A Compelling Interest

Because Utah's stalking statute threatens protected conduct
in a real and substantial way, it must serve a compelling state
interest and must be narrowly tailored to meet that interest if
the law has any tendency to restrict First Amendment rights.
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Board, 112 S.Ct.
501, 509 (1991) . Though the State of Utah certainly has a
legitimate interest in prohibiting "stalking" type of conduct
which threatens and harasses people, as noted above, the Utah
statute is far from narrowly tailored to serve that state
interest.

Instead, Utah went far beyond the model statutes that

existed such as in California and Florida and proscribed all
physical and visual proximity limited only by the emotional
distress language.

As the Utah Statute is not narrowly tailored,

it should be determined to be unconstitutional as overbroad on
its face.
D-

Utah's Stalking Statute Is Unconstitutional As Applied
to Mr. Lopez7 Case

The testimony at trial did not evidence any type of verbal
or written threat made by Mr. Lopez.

Indeed, Ms. Mota testified

that on two occasions, Mr. Lopez stated that he loved her.

Under

the statute, however, the jury needed only to have found that Mr.
12

Lopez was intentionally or knowingly in the physical or visual
proximity of Ms. Mota and that such proximity: (1) would cause a
reasonable person emotional distress; (2) that Mr. Lopez had
knowledge or should have known that Ms. Mota would suffer
emotional distress; and (3) that Ms. Mota did suffer emotional
distress based upon the proximity.
As discussed above, Mr. Lopez has a constitutional right of
association and freedom of movement under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as well
as Article I, sections 1 and 15 of the Utah Constitution.
Without finding any threat or conduct constituting a threat, the
jury could have found that any two of Mr. Lopez' brief encounters
constituted a course of conduct.

The jury therefore could have

found Mr. Lopez guilty based upon conduct which is
constitutionally protected and the statute is therefore
unconstitutional as applied to the specific facts of Mr. Lopez'
case.
II.

THE UTAH STALKING STATUTE FAILS TO DEFINE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE ON ITS FACE
The vagueness doctrine requires that a statute define an

"offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."

State

v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v.
Greenwood, 817 P.2d at 819); see also, Kolendar v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983)(holding unconstitutionally vague a
statute requiring a person to provide "credible and reliable"
13

identification when requested by a police officer).

"It is a

basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined."

State v.

Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 , 927 (Utah App. 1991) (citation
omitted).

Courts insist "that laws give the person of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,
so that he may act accordingly."
408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).

Gravned v. City of Rockford,

Statutes which are alleged to prohibit

First Amendment type speech and conduct may also be facially
challenged for vagueness.

Mavnard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356,

361 (1988).
As discussed above, Utah's statute prohibits a course of
conduct with the only limiting factor being defined by the phrase
"emotional distress."

However, the phrase "emotional distress"

is not defined in the statute.

The Faulkner article discusses

other state courts which have found that the failure to define
the same phrase was unconstitutional.

Faulkner at 25.

In

Commonwealth v. Camper, No. 93-2876 (Va. Gen. Dist. Ct. Apr. 9,
1993), a Virginia trial court struck down that state's antistalking statute partly on vagueness grounds where the statute
required that a stalking perpetrator must "engage in conduct"
with an "intent to cause emotional distress."

Faulkner at 24.

These phrases were too ill-defined to put the public and the
police on notice as to what conduct is and is not proscribed.
Similarly, in United States v. Smith. No. M-6400-93 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 1993), the District of Columbia Superior
14

Court invalidated a stalking ordinance partly on vagueness
grounds because the statute:
fails to define terms such as "emotional
distress" and "harassing" with particularity
even though such terms are essential to
understanding what conduct the statute makes
criminal. Under this version of the statute,
law enforcement personnel are left to their
own subjective interpretations as to what
constitutes "emotional distress" or
"harassing." What may constitute emotional
distress or harassment to one person may be
different to another person and could depend
on the tolerance level of the persons
enforcing the statute or the person to which
such conduct is directed.
Faulkner at 25.
The phrase "emotional distress" is not one which has some
common understanding in the general public.

It is interesting

that the term "repeatedly" is specifically defined, yet a concept
such as "emotional distress" which is more a legal term of art
than a concept with any specific definition is left to the
state's and ultimately the jury's discretion as to what meaning
to apply.

Because the concept of emotional distress is vague, no

person can know with any degree of certainty whether a reasonable
person might suffer from it from the accused's visual or physical
proximity.

Since emotional distress is such a key part of Utah's

Stalking statute, there is no way to correct the problem without
a statutory definition and the statute is unconstitutionally
vague on its face.

15

REASONS SUPPORTING ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED OPINION
This case raises issues of first impression in Utah.

No

prior published opinion in this State has addressed the
constitutionality of Utah's Stalking statute.

Because of the

frequency with which the Stalking statute is being applied, these
issues have far reaching consequences for other defendants.
Appellant respectfully requests oral argument and a published
decision.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, Lopez respectfully
requests that this Court reverse his conviction for Stalking on
the basis that Utah's Stalking statute is unconstitutionally
overbroad both facially and as applied under the United States
Constitution and the Utah Constitution.

Additionally, Lopez

requests that this Court find the Utah Stalking statute
unconstitutionally vague on its face.
DATED this ^h; day of September, 1996

cJDKtflD VrTlNLAYSON
Attorney for Appellant
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Criminal/Traffic
CITY/STATE

qLirmmznp

Case Number

Plaintiff,

C#

Tape Number
Number _
Time

Date
Judge//Qqmm

VSZJAJHPJ
^

Clerk

Defendant

IL

Plaintiff
Counsel
in Counsel.

DOB:.
Interpreter
CHARGES

,
/Qfof.

Defense Counsel

piptir M

crfr!A(J(u pny)

Amended
Amended

AS FOLLOWS:
THE COURT SENTENj
rENCED THE DEFENDANT
DEFEND

motojup

(1) Jail

Suspend

MQ.

Defendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence.
(2)FineAmt. $ ^O^AJ

Susp. $.

Fine Bal $

Fee $

ferrr

QjmOMjM
TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $
Payment Schedule: Pay
(3) Court Costs

3D

per month/ 1st Pmt. Due Jy^O^L(2

Last Pmt. D u e T l V

KTTV ^ W

$

(4) Community Service/WP
(5) Restitution

through

$

Pay to: • Court • Victim • Show Proof to Court

Attorney Fees $
(6) Probation Jf$

H^^ffj^

fcf&ood

Behavior QAP&P

s of Probation:
No Further Violations

(7)

fAA Meetings.
•

./wk

./month

^

* ^

^

/ffTffifflJi^.

Health Testing

• Crime Lab Procedure
U

u

flAVlit U y

(8) Plea in Abeyance/ Diversion
/_

/

3-50^

U Classes

•

I Proof of
<

(9) Review

too.

D In/Out Treatment

(J No Alcohol

|Employment

D Other

JS Counseling thru

Follow Program

QAntibuse

DACEC

at

,

.

*

A

In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third Circuit
Court at 238-7391, at least three working days prior to the proceeding.
APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF JUDGMENT
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SALT LAKE CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
451 South 200 East, #125Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 535-7767

/

S3 JAi! 12 py3 : 08
o »

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
/

01 tDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
/
MOTION TO DISMISS

SALT LAKE CITY,
a Municipal Corporation,

1/

Plaintiff,
•s.

/

ROBERTO LOPEZ,

Case No. 941008952

/
Judge Robert K. Hilder

Defendant.

/

Based on legal arguments of counsel, memoranda, and supporting material filed by the
parties, the court finds that Utah's anti-stalking law, §76-5-106.5, Utah Code Ann., is not
unconstitutional on its face.

The court reserves for trial the issue of whether the law is

/

unconstitutional as applied in defendant's case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Hoi/ Robert K. Hilder
Third Circuit Court Judge

DATED this /J'

day of January, 1996.

Submitted by:

Vifginia Ward
^ S ^ * ' ^
Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor

Approved as to form:

Davki^shlayson
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
MAILED/DELIVERED the order denying defendant's motion to dismiss, this
day of January, 1996, to the following:
David Finlayson
Attorney for Defendant
454 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ADDENDUM C

AMENDMENT I
[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress snail make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging
thefreedomof speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment]
Section 1. [Citizenship —Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized m the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abndge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
S e c 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint*
ment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives m Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is demed to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or m any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age m such State.
Sec, S. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative m Congress,
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office,
evil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
*ny State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
•hall have engaged m insurrection or rebellion against the
aame, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
•wch disability
See 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authonz
ad by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions
and bounties for services m suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion agamst the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal
and void
S e c 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates of their con*
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right
ISM

S e c 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press —LlbeL]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain thefreedomof
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact
ust

76-5-106.5. Definition* — Crime of stalking.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) 'Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining
a visual or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly
conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by
conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a
person.
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child,
sibling, or any other person who regularly resides in the
household or who regularly resided in the household
within the prior six months.
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a
reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of
his immediate family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself u in
member of his immediate family;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the
specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury
to himself or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of
his immediate family will suffer emotional distress;
and
(c) whose conduct:
(i) induces fear in the specific person of ''bodily
injury to himself cur a member of his immediate
family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person
or a member of his immediate family.
(3) Stalking is a class B misdemeanor.
(4) (a) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor if the offender:
(i) has been previously convicted of an offense of
stalking;
(ii) has been convicted in another jurisdiction of an
offense that is substantially similar to the offense of
stalking; or
(iii) has been previously convicted of any felony
offense in Utah or of any crime in another jurisdiction
which if committed in Utah would be a felony, in
which the victim of the stalking or a member of the
victim's immediate family was also a victim of the
previous felony offense.
(5) Stalking is a felony of the third degree if the offender:
(a) used a dangerous weapon as denned in Section
76-1-601 under drcvmatancea not amounting to a violation of Subsection 76-5-103(lXa), or used other means or
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, in
the commission of the crime of stalking;
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of
the offense of stalking;
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another
jurisdiction or jurisdictions of offenses that are substantially similar to the offense of stalking;
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any
combination, of offenses under Subsections (5Xb) and (c);
or
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of
felony offenses in Utah or of crimes in another jurisdiction
or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah, would be
felonies, in which the victim of the stalking was also a
victim of the previous felony offenses.
lift

